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 Over the past decade, national and international interest in technol-
ogy entrepreneurship in Kenya has surged, in part as a result of the 
rapid dissemination of mobile technologies, the installation of digital 
infrastructure grids, and the growing consumer markets for technol-
ogy in East Africa (Hussey  2015 ). In Nairobi in particular, computer 
scientists, bloggers, and technology enthusiasts have been creating and 
seizing opportunities to build technology businesses. To support their 
endeavors, a number of innovation hubs—spaces dedicated to nurtur-
ing technology entrepreneurship, usually through business incubation 
or acceleration—have become operational. At the same time, local and 
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international impact, angel, and seed fund investors have been fl ocking 
to Nairobi in hopes of identifying and sponsoring Nairobi’s next big 
technology start-ups. 
 As such, the budding community around technology entrepreneur-
ship in Kenya seems well positioned to “churn out one successful start-up 
after the next,” as one of our informants put it. Yet, entrepreneurs, inno-
vation hubs, journalists, and investors alike agree that creating sustainable 
technology businesses in Nairobi has continued to be extremely diffi  cult 
(Quartz  2014 ; Mulupi  2013 ). What is more, patience is beginning to 
wane—and skeptics have begun voicing doubts about Nairobi’s potential 
as the metropolitan center for East African technology entrepreneurship 
(Reuters  2014 ). 
 For more than 20 years now, a rich stream of research has shown 
that, in emerging markets, low levels of consumer demand, weakly 
developed fi nancial markets, ineffi  cient administrative systems, and 
underdeveloped physical infrastructures can constitute signifi cant barri-
ers to launching a successful business (see, e.g., Honig  1998 ; Pissarides 
et al.  2003 ). Although these factors may partially explain some of the 
diffi  culties that entrepreneurs encounter, our attention was drawn to 
another one—the relative novelty of technology entrepreneurship per 
se in Nairobi: Th e fi rst computer science courses were introduced across 
the city’s universities only in the late 1990s, and the spread of technol-
ogy—especially mobile phones and Internet grids—began less than a 
decade ago (Th e Economist  2012 ).  Could it be, then, that  new forms of 
entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies—in our case, technol-
ogy entrepreneurship in Nairobi—are faced with added challenges as a 
result of their novelty? 
 Drawing on an in-depth qualitative case study consisting of over 
70 interviews and various written accounts, we explored the perspec-
tives of those directly involved in technology entrepreneurship in 
Nairobi, i.e. technology entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and inves-
tors. We found that contradictory perspectives about the availability 
of capital, divergent views on what constituted key business skills, 
and misaligned perceptions of potential technology consumer mar-
kets characterized interactions among the actors involved in Nairobi’s 
technology  entrepreneurship. From our analysis, we conclude that 
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these disconnects constitute an additional challenge to novel forms of 
 entrepreneurial activity by complicating capital fl ows, business skills 
development, market identifi cation, and thus ultimately the creation 
of new technology businesses. 
 Th e chapter is organized as follows: First, we provide an overview of 
existing research on the challenges to entrepreneurship in emerging mar-
kets, followed by a brief refl ection on the nature of new forms of entre-
preneurial activities. After a summary of our methodology and research 
context, we explicate our fi ndings. Th e chapter concludes with recom-
mendations for those seeking to foster an environment conducive to 
technology entrepreneurship in Nairobi (and possibly in other contexts 
where technology entrepreneurship constitutes a new form of entrepre-
neurial activity). 
 Challenges to Entrepreneurship 
 Barriers to Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets 
 Emerging markets can be defi ned as contexts that exhibit a high pace of 
economic development while lacking institutional features such as sta-
ble political, fi nancial, and legal systems; regulations; and infrastructures 
(Hoskisson et al.  2000 ). An important stream of research has investigated 
entrepreneurship in emerging markets and, identifi ed four central barriers 
to entrepreneurship that often persist: lack of fi nancial capital, low levels of 
demand for new products and services, ineffi  cient administrative systems, 
and underdeveloped physical infrastructures. Th ese constraints especially 
characterize sub-Saharan Africa, where business creation “is typically more 
diffi  cult than in other parts of the world” (Rivera-Santos et al.  2015 ). 
 First, emerging economies tend to exhibit rudimentary and some-
times barely functioning fi nancial markets. Often linked to more gen-
eral problems of high depreciation and infl ation rates (Pissarides et  al. 
 2003 ), this causes diffi  culties in securing capital for business creation. In 
Kenya, for example, interest rates average around 9 percent (Julian and 
Ofori-Dankwa  2013 ; World Bank  2015b ). Consequently, entrepreneurs 
often have no choice but to rely on personal savings or informal lending 
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through their social networks in order to fund their ventures (Th ornton 
et al.  2011 ). 
 Second, emerging markets tend to exhibit relatively low levels of 
demand for new products and services. Orser et al. ( 2000 ) explained that 
because subsistence incomes prevail in emerging markets, potential cus-
tomers are less likely to risk spending the small amounts of available cash 
on new products and services whose functionality has not yet been con-
fi rmed by widespread adoption. In Kenya, although penetration rates for 
mobile phones are relatively high, consumers have been comparatively 
hesitant to buy technology innovations that were locally created. Instead, 
consumers prefer the products and services of global technology com-
panies such as IBM, Nokia, and Huawei, which dominate mobile and 
software markets in Kenya (Reuters  2014 ). 
 Th ird, legal and administrative systems are often marked by slow 
procedures, corruption, and a lack of property rights enforcement (Peci 
et  al.  2012 ), which make processes associated with the creation and 
operation of a new business time-consuming and unnecessarily costly 
(Aidis et al.  2012 ; Peng and Shekshnia  2001 ). Kenya ranks 136th (of 
189 economies) for ease of doing business, with administrative costs 
for setting up a business requiring over 40 percent of the average gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita (World Bank  2015a ). Often, there-
fore, in order to save costs and time, entrepreneurs hesitate to register 
their new businesses, which, in turn, excludes them from property rights 
protection and other legal safety nets, as fragmented as they may be 
(Khavul et al.  2009 ). 
 Finally, infrastructures are frequently inadequate for business cre-
ation in emerging markets, impeding access to suppliers, consumer 
markets, and market information (Coad and Tamvada  2012 ). Nairobi 
struggles particularly with the insuffi  cient capacity of its roads and 
its power grid (Blas  2013 ). Entrepreneurs in emerging markets may 
therefore incur additional costs in order to reach suppliers as well as 
customers. One frequently used strategy is to rely on personal net-
works to access market information and suppliers and to disseminate 
products or services through family and friends (Jack and Anderson 
 2002 ; Th ornton et al.  2011 ). 
268 M. de la Chaux and A. Okune
 New Forms of Entrepreneurial Activity 
 In a sense, any entrepreneurial activity is new, because it consists of the 
discovery and exploitation of previously unrecognized but potentially 
profi table business opportunities (Shane and Venkatamaran  2000 ). 
Researchers, however, have distinguished several forms of entrepreneur-
ial activity. Th ornton ( 1999 ), for example, distinguished demand- and 
supply-driven forms. Kunkel ( 2001 ) developed a typology that distin-
guished between need-driven, technology-driven, low-growth-potential, 
income-substituting, part-time, and lifestyle forms of entrepreneurship. 
 In addition to motivation-based approaches, entrepreneurial activity 
can also be classifi ed according to the types of new ventures that ensue 
(cf. Gartner et al.  1989 ). Social enterprises, for instance, are associated 
with distinctive forms of entrepreneurial activity. By combining social 
and market objectives, social enterprises’ business models, strategies, 
and funding streams diff er signifi cantly from those of more traditional 
businesses (Austin et al.  2006 ). Technology businesses, similarly, are also 
associated with distinct types of entrepreneurial activity. A key diff er-
entiator, as Beckman et  al. ( 2012 ) emphasized, is that innovations in 
science and engineering, rather than market demand, drive technology 
entrepreneurship. 
 When new forms of entrepreneurial activity fi rst emerge, they may 
face a variety of challenges. For example, structures that facilitate the 
new form may not yet be in place. Social entrepreneurs, for example, 
initially had diffi  culty in formally registering their businesses, because 
the organizational structure blending social and for-profi t values did not 
yet legally exist (Galera and Borzaga  2009 ). Similarly, reliable patent-
ing processes for the commercialization of technologies only developed 
over time, as technology entrepreneurship became established as a dis-
tinctive type of entrepreneurial activity (Datta et  al.  2015 ). Moreover, 
traditional stakeholders such as investors or universities may not initially 
understand and share the perspectives, values, or practices associated 
with the new forms of entrepreneurial activity. By taking stock of current 
developments, Cooper ( 1973 ), presented and described to the academic 
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 community the then-new phenomenon of technology entrepreneurship 
in North America. 
 In summary, entrepreneurial activity may be classifi ed according to 
the drivers or the types of ventures created. In either case, new forms of 
entrepreneurial activity are associated with additional challenges, such as 
limited acceptance from stakeholders or a lack of legal support. However, 
research so far has focused on industrialized economies, where new types 
of entrepreneurs do not also encounter the lack of fi nancial markets, 
low levels of demand, ineff ective policies, and weak infrastructure that 
entrepreneurs in emerging markets must cope with. As a result, little is 
understood about the challenges associated specifi cally with new forms of 
entrepreneurial activity in emerging markets. 
 A Case Study of Technology Entrepreneurship 
in Nairobi 
 To learn more, therefore, we drew on an in-depth qualitative case study 
highlighting the challenges associated with new forms of entrepreneur-
ial activity in Nairobi. Entrepreneurship itself is, of course, not new in 
the region. Informal entrepreneurs such as the  jua kali (Kiswahili for 
“hot sun”) as well as entrepreneurial activity related to agriculture and 
real estate have existed for decades (King  1996 ). However, technology 
entrepreneurship constitutes a new type of entrepreneurial activity. In 
comparison with existing types, technology entrepreneurship relies heav-
ily on science innovations and therefore a strong technology skill and 
knowledge base. Nairobi’s universities, however, only graduated their fi rst 
computer scientists in 1997 (20 students at the University of Nairobi), 
1998 (21 students at the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and 
Technology), and 2003 (20 students at Kenyatta University). 1 In addi-
tion, unlike agriculture and real estate entrepreneurship, software and 
mobile technology entrepreneurship caters to consumers who already 
own the necessary technological hardware. A potential Kenyan consumer 
base for technology entrepreneurship only evolved in the mid-2000s, 
1  Th ese fi gures were provided by our informants. 
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 following signifi cant infrastructural improvements and the rapid dissem-
ination of mobile phones across the country. In 2007, only 30 percent 
of Kenyans owned a mobile phone; in 2014, the fi gure stood at roughly 
80 percent (Communications Authority of Kenya  2015 ). Finally, tech-
nology enterprises tend to compete globally, because technology inno-
vations—particularly software and mobile-technology innovations—can 
be relatively independent of context (Wickham and Vecchi  2008 ). Th is 
further distinguishes technology entrepreneurship from many other 
forms of entrepreneurial activity, which tend to be localized. 
 Since 2010, a variety of innovation hubs have taken up operations in 
Nairobi to promote and facilitate the creation of technology ventures. 
Manske ( 2014 ) remarked on the hubs’ centrality to technology entre-
preneurship in the city, writing that “until 2010, around the time when 
iHub (one of Nairobi’s fi rst innovation hubs) was becoming a reality 
there wasn’t much to say about the local tech ecosystem.” Currently, at 
least six innovation hubs operate out of Nairobi. 
 Our case study consists of more than 70 semi-structured qualitative 
interviews with technology entrepreneurs, investors, innovation hub 
staff , and technology professionals in Nairobi, and explores their views 
on technology entrepreneurship. Th e interviews ranged from 30 minutes 
to 2 hours, with an average of 65 minutes apiece. In addition, Angela 
Okune, the second author of this chapter, served as the research director 
at iHub, Nairobi’s largest innovation space for technology entrepreneur-
ship, giving her detailed insight into various social dynamics over time 
that might have remained implicit during the interviews with some of our 
informants. We captured these insights in the form of a written narrative. 
 Taking a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss  1967 )—in 
which the theory emerges from the data rather than data confi rming exist-
ing hypotheses—we analyzed our rich data by fi rst broadly grouping pieces 
of information. From this, three groups of actors—technology entrepre-
neurs, investors, and innovation hub staff —emerged as being central 
to the processes and practices of technology entrepreneurship. Th rough 
iterative coding, we compared the three groups’ views 2 on  technology 
2  Although the individuals within each group naturally also expressed some degree of heterogeneity 
in their views, an analysis of their individual views is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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 entrepreneurship, which revealed three recurring themes: fi nancial capital, 
business skills, and market readiness. Finally, we discussed our analysis 
with key informants to ensure validity and reliability. 
 Perspectives on Technology Entrepreneurship: 
Contradiction, Divergence, and Misalignment 
 Our fi ndings are presented in three parts. First, we bring to the surface 
the contradictory perspectives among technology entrepreneurs, innova-
tion hub staff , and investors on the role of fi nancial capital. Second, we 
examine the divergent understandings that the three groups have of the 
business skills that are crucial to technology entrepreneurship. Finally, 
we analyze how understandings of what constitutes a viable technology 
consumer market are misaligned. 
 Too Much Seed Capital or Too Little? 
 We found, perhaps most saliently, that the entrepreneurs, innovation hub 
staff , and investors had contradictory views about the availability of fi nancial 
capital for technology start-ups. Whereas the entrepreneurs saw a disconnect 
between the investments they seek and the investments that are available, the 
innovation hub staff  problematized an overall lack of capital, and the inves-
tors complained that start-ups have too much funding available. 
 Entrepreneurs: Disconnect between Available Funding 
and Funding Sought 
 Th e technology entrepreneurs spoke of three types of disconnects 
between the funding available and the funding sought: the accessibility 
of  funding generally, the volume of capital needed, and the type of invest-
ment sought. 
 First, our data revealed that many entrepreneurs looking for invest-
ments struggled to approach investors. A survey showed that fully 75 
percent of start-ups in Kenya looking for external fi nancing did not 
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 contact investors (GSMA  2014 ). Often, this seems to have been caused 
by information gaps and subsequent ambiguities about where and how to 
approach suitable investors. As one informant explained, “Th e informa-
tion about available funding doesn’t get to the right people.” 
 Second, many technology entrepreneurs perceived a challenge in 
attracting the appropriate amounts of capital. One entrepreneur said:
 Th ere’s a gap for investments for start-ups who probably need something 
like USD100,000. Because the guys who want to invest are willing to put 
in at least USD500,000, you know? And there’s this other side of investors 
who want to put in USD25,000 [or] USD10,000. And so the gap for 
growth and really making it matter is….lacking. 
 Finally, the entrepreneurs perceived a disconnect between the types 
of funding sought and the types of funding off ered. Although capital 
from donations and impact investments might be available, many entre-
preneurs have become wary of the associated administrative processes, 
often in the form of regular reports and presentations. As one technology 
entrepreneur explained:
 I was just sent a 13-page document that asked me to compile a 100-page 
report to get money from a fund. I don’t have the time to manage those 
kinds of strings attached. 
 Innovation Hubs: Lack of Seed Capital 
 By contrast, many founders and managers of innovation hubs in Nairobi 
perceived that an overall lack of seed capital was hampering the survival 
and growth of promising technology start-ups. As one hub employee 
elaborated: “It’s capital. Even in Silicon Valley they probably say that they 
don’t have enough capital. But it really is lacking here.” Innovation hubs 
particularly cited the overwhelming number of start-ups—an estimated 
80 percent (GSMA  2014 )—that rely on personal savings or family net-
works for capital. Moreover, capital through bank loans is also often inac-
cessible, with interest rates for technology start-ups hovering at around 20 
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percent (Reuters  2014 ). Th e manager of one innovation hub spelled out 
the consequences:
 When they [entrepreneurs] run out of money, they panic and start apply-
ing for random grants and competitions. Some of them just do another 
[incubation or acceleration] program — totally unreasonable. Th ey should 
focus on reaching their customers and making money that way instead of 
going from program to program. 
 Investors: Too Much Seed Funding 
 Th e venture capital and angel investors perceived a diff erent reality: 
Instead of a lack of capital, they saw an oversupply. One informant com-
plained that “Africa is over-fl ooded with money,” and other investors said 
they have struggled with a scarcity of investment opportunities:
 We have a couple of start-ups that we’re interested [in] investing in and 
we’re doing due diligence. But I’m not overloaded with so many good start- 
ups that we feel like we do not have enough money. 
 Th e investors off ered two explanations for the lack of investment oppor-
tunities. First, they perceived the prominence of grants and social invest-
ments as crowding out other investments. Over the past years, the 
World Bank’s InfoDev has disbursed multi-million-dollar grants to nur-
ture information and communication technology (ICT) innovation in 
Nairobi, while impact and not-for-profi t investors such as the Acumen 
Fund and the Rockefeller Foundation have operated their (East) African 
headquarters from Nairobi (InfoDev  2014 ; Th e East African  2012 ). A 
seed capital investor added:
 If a start-up can get a grant from one of the development agencies, they get 
the money and nobody asks what they do with it. Th ey are spoilt with all 
the development money. But we can’t do that. We are not a charity. 
 Second, the investors perceived a shortage of start-ups that met their 
criteria. In particular, many prospective investees were missing  formal 
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records that conventionally form the basis of investment decisions. 
Many investors expressed surprise about the lack of accounting prac-
tices and business planning among start-ups and subsequently doubted 
entrepreneurs’ ambition and trustworthiness. In one case, a seed fund 
manager explained that after a start-up received the funds’ investment, 
“they stopped answering…emails; they stopped paying their staff  and 
apparently moved to the coast with the money.” Such examples, although 
extreme, further decrease investors’ confi dence in potential investment 
opportunities. 
 Divergent Notions of Business Skills 
 Although the entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and investors agreed 
on the importance of building technology–business skills, we found that 
their views of how business skills should be prioritized diverged. Whereas 
the entrepreneurs focused on planning and strategy, the hub staff  priori-
tized the importance of team building and leadership, and the investors 
emphasized administrative and structural skills. 
 Entrepreneurs: Strategy and Planning 
 Th e entrepreneurs explained that the ability to iterate on a business model 
and product as well as selling ideas to potential investors and customers 
were crucial. In other words, they felt that being passionate about an idea 
was one component while turning the idea into a business was another:
 It’s easy to have an idea and you’re very passionate but nobody cares. You 
talk to investors and angels and they’re not interested. I think once you 
make your idea one that people care about you’ve got a sustainable 
business. 
 In addition to understanding how to move from idea to business, 
the entrepreneurs saw the creation of business structures as another key 
skill they lacked. Many of the entrepreneurs used start-up terms, such 
as “minimum viable product,” “prototyping,” or “fail fast,” during our 
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interviews. Th eir familiarity with such terms alone, however, seems insuf-
fi cient for successfully implementing the associated business structures. 
One entrepreneur remarked:
 Talk to the start-ups that are sitting there [co-working at a hub] and I guar-
antee you that not a single one of them would know their numbers. Th ey 
wouldn’t have anything available that investors would want to see. 
 Innovation Hubs: Team Building and Leadership 
 Th e innovation hub staff  primarily perceived the importance of building 
a strong founding team. Th is stemmed from innovation hub staff  seeing 
technology entrepreneurs focus on the technology aspects of their idea 
and, as they progressed from idea to product, realize they lacked the 
business skills to build a company. A member of one innovation hub’s 
staff  noted:
 Th e most ‘successful’ start-ups all have at least one businessperson with a 
nontechnical background. If someone is working alone on their business, 
most likely this person won’t be successful in their entrepreneurial attempt. 
 Almost half of Kenyan start-up founders have a technical background 
(GSMA  2014 ), and without a strong business leader on their team, such 
start-ups can end up fi xating on technical details such as perfecting code. 
 Second—and closely linked to building a strong team—the hub staff  
perceived a lack of leadership skills among entrepreneurs. Leadership was 
understood to be crucial for communicating the vision of the business 
and attracting high-quality team members who shared a founder’s vision 
and values. Leadership of a multidisciplinary team, however, may require 
founders to communicate their technological innovations and ideas in 
simple, eff ective terms to those who may be unfamiliar with technology 
jargon. A hub staff  member explained:
 It’s diffi  cult for young entrepreneurs to articulate [their vision and values] 
and to play that leadership role. Controlling for the quality of the idea, the 
next important factor is leadership. Leadership and business skills are 
intertwined. 
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 Investors: Business Administration 
 Th e investors expressed surprise at the lack of fi nancial and administra-
tive structures they saw among technology start-ups. A venture capital 
investor said:
 We need to see that they keep budgets, that they keep track of their income 
and their expenditures, that they have a plan for income, that they have a 
long-term plan for returns — and they don’t do that. Most of the start-ups 
don’t track anything they do and then there is nothing you can do. Because 
even if I think they have potential, I can’t make a positive decision. I have 
to justify why we…should fi nance them…and I can’t do that if I have 
nothing written…if I have no accounts to show me what they are doing. 
 To investors, accounting and fi nancial skills were therefore key for dem-
onstrating a start-up’s business potential. Because investors primarily use 
fi nancial models to make investment decisions, the absence of fi nancial 
fi gures captured through regular, reliable bookkeeping makes it diffi  cult 
to assess the future profi tability of a start-up—suggesting that when tech-
nology start-ups learn the value of good accounting, they will be more 
likely to receive investments. 
 Misaligned Market Perspectives 
 A company that cannot fi nd customers to purchase its products or services 
will struggle to survive. Identifying the right market, however, sounds sim-
pler than it often is. A recent poll among the founders of failed start-ups 
revealed that 42 percent cited a lack of a market need for their product as 
the primary reason for the business’s failure (Fortune  2014 ). Despite Kenya’s 
high mobile phone penetration, an established customer base for emergent 
technology innovations is still lacking. Consequently, we found that entre-
preneurs, innovation hub staff , and investors have each developed their own 
interpretations of what constitutes a viable market for technology in Nairobi. 
 Entrepreneurs: Fuzzy Markets 
 Entrepreneurs encounter a high degree of skepticism among potential 
customers. Although mobile phones have penetrated daily life in Nairobi, 
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many potential customers seem to remain hesitant about mobile-related 
innovations and other technologies. Many entrepreneurs have reported 
diffi  culties when trying to sell their technology product or service. Th e 
founder of a small start-up summarized the situation as follows:
 A real challenge is market matureness. Everything else you can overcome 
and turn into an opportunity. Th is you can’t. Th ere is a widespread lack of 
trust in Kenyan society. Th at’s probably the result of many years of harden-
ing experiences. People here don’t trust that your product will deliver what 
it’s promising, and they don’t believe that you’ll stick around or can be 
taken seriously. 
 To overcome this barrier, a number of technology entrepreneurs have 
turned to what we term the nonprofi t market, composed of international 
development agencies and nongovernmental and nonprofi t organizations 
that have expressed interest in using technology to resolve challenges at 
the economic base of the pyramid. In contrast to for-profi t markets, 
where profi t is made through product sales, nonprofi t markets give grants 
to start-ups so that they target benefi ciaries, that is, those at the bottom 
of the pyramid who cannot otherwise aff ord to pay for the company’s 
product or service. As one technology entrepreneur explained:
 [For grants] you need to hit as many poor people in the slums as possible. 
Th at might be diff erent from what angel [investors] say. Th ey care more 
about whether you can actually make money out of the people in the slums 
whereas someone else [giving a grant] might say, “Do it all for free, just hit 
the numbers.” 
 Innovation Hubs: Designing for Markets 
 In contrast with the lack of market readiness that the entrepreneurs per-
ceived, the innovation hub employees found that the majority of tech-
nology entrepreneurs failed to develop adequate products for existing 
markets. As one hub manager said:
 Honestly, the customers are there. Th at’s not the main issue. You just have 
to design a product that fi ts what they want. 
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 Most hub employees explained that the majority of technology entrepre-
neurs failed to identify and address appropriate markets for their prod-
ucts and services. In particular, the innovation hub employees perceived 
that the majority of technology start-ups conducted insuffi  cient market 
research and did not pilot their product or iterate on customer feedback. 
Th e hubs therefore emphasized the importance of tailoring products and 
services to customer demand and have off ered a variety of mentoring 
opportunities to guide entrepreneurs. Innovation hub employees seemed 
to remain impartial about the type of markets that businesses could 
viably target. Whether start-ups fi nd customers that are willing to pay 
for a start-up’s products and services or whether they obtain grants from 
nonprofi ts to distribute their products, the hubs’ main concern was that 
entrepreneurs frame any kind of market in the fi rst place. 
 Investors: Identifying Market Boundaries 
 Th e investors tended to perceive consumer-driven markets—that is, markets 
composed of individuals and businesses that purchase a start- up’s products 
and services—to be the only viable target markets. Th is contrasted with the 
technology entrepreneurs and innovation hub staff , who also perceived the 
viability of designing for nonprofi t markets. One investor elaborated on 
start-ups that tailored their products and services to the nonprofi t market:
 Th e development money, it’s not helping them become sustainable. Th ey 
start designing their business plan to target development agencies and not 
the customer, and then once the grant runs out it’s a dead end. And then 
that makes it hard for us. Because all these companies might be run by 
promising entrepreneurs, but they have the wrong incentives. 
 Recognizing that the number of potential customers for technology 
goods and services may not yet be large enough to make start-ups sus-
tainable, many of the investors therefore emphasized the importance of 
instead developing technology products and services for the East African 
market at large. In contrast to the entrepreneurs and innovation hubs, 
the investors thus perceived the only viable markets to be customers that 
purchase technology start-ups’ goods and services. 
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 Discussion: Disconnected Perspectives 
as Challenges to Technology Entrepreneurship 
in Nairobi 
 In the previous section, we presented the perspectives of three key groups 
of actors—technology entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and inves-
tors—on the availability of capital, business skills, and the readiness of 
technology markets. To conclude, we refl ect on how these disconnected 
perspectives may constitute additional barriers to technology entrepre-
neurship in Nairobi (see Table  9.1 ).
 Table 9.1  Summary of actors’ disconnected perspectives on technology entrepre-
neurship in Nairobi 
 Entrepreneurs 
 Innovation hub 



















 Lack of idea 
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development 
 Lack of team 
management 
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 Contradictory Perspectives: Financial Capital 
 First, we found that the entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and inves-
tors expressed contradictory views about the availability of capital for 
technology entrepreneurship. Technology entrepreneurs consequently 
encounter an additional barrier when attempting to secure funding, 
namely the need to bridge these contradictory views. 
 Many of the entrepreneurs remarked that, incentivizing North 
American or European entrepreneurs to join the start-up’s board or 
founding team meet investors’ expectations and helps attract fi nancial 
investments. Th e vast majority of angels and venture capital investors 
have been non-Kenyan, and merely 26 percent of investments have been 
made to start-ups founded by Kenyans thus far (GSMA  2014 ). One 
foreign entrepreneur explained that she built trust with another foreign 
investor based on their shared love of a soccer team, which ultimately 
secured an investment. A serial Kenyan entrepreneur summarized:
 You’d be surprised by how this ecosystem works. Me and four locals trying 
to nail a partnership would take years. But just bring in a non-local, we just 
need to have them in the meeting and then we look more serious. It’s a 
reality. 
 Because perspectives on the availability of capital for technology start- 
ups are contradictory, entrepreneurs incur additional (search) costs by, 
for instance, requiring co-founders to have certain geographical origins. 
 Simultaneously, innovation hub employees attempt to identify prom-
ising start-ups and connect them to capital. However, because interpre-
tations of what constituted a start-up suitable for investments diff ered 
between the hub staff  and the investors, the investors incurred additional 
costs by spending time and resources on start-ups that did not meet their 
criteria. An investor explained:
 Th e teams that were recommended by [an innovation hub], we look at 
their pitch deck and it’s so bad. And we’re like, “You’re coming from a good 
reference…but we can’t see it.” So I did three revisions on a pitch deck for 
a team because they were recommended to us. 
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 Divergent Perspectives: Business Skills 
 Although the entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and investors agreed 
that business skills are helpful in the creation of sustainable businesses, we 
found that they diverged in their interpretations of which business skills 
were most crucial at the onset of the entrepreneurial journey. Th e entre-
preneurs perceived the importance of strategic planning, the hub staff  
considered business leadership to be central, and the investors emphasized 
business administration. Th is has several consequences for the practices 
associated with technology entrepreneurship. Although all business skills 
are likely to be helpful at some point during a start-up’s  development, skill 
prioritization is critical, given most ventures’ limited time and resources. 
Th is prioritization, however, may be skewed toward the interests of inno-
vation hubs and investors rather than the start-up’s actual needs for skill 
development. One technology entrepreneur explained:
 Th ey [innovation hub] took us to a training for fundraising, but I didn’t 
fi nd it useful because my business wasn’t at the stage for fundraising. At 
that [idea stage] moment, it’s sort of a waste because when my start-up gets 
to that level, now I’ll need that training again. 
 As a result of divergent views on how to prioritize business skill develop-
ment, entrepreneurs may be induced to spend time and resources on, 
for example, attending training programs that do not immediately fi t 
their needs in order to fulfi ll the expectations of innovation hubs and 
investors. By doing so, they demonstrate to the hubs and investors their 
motivation to strengthen various leadership and business administration 
skills. But they also drain time and resources from the actual technol-
ogy start-up—meaning that divergent views on business skills become an 
additional barrier to technology entrepreneurship. 
 Misaligned Perspectives: Market Readiness 
 Finally, we found that views on the composition of viable technology con-
sumer markets were misaligned between the entrepreneurs,  innovation 
282 M. de la Chaux and A. Okune
hub staff , and investors. Th is can generate even more ambiguity about 
market readiness, and thus constitutes an additional barrier to technol-
ogy entrepreneurship. More specifi cally, some technology entrepreneurs 
tended to become trapped in a cycle where initial skepticism among con-
sumers made the nonprofi t sector appear to be the more viable market. 
After initial growth, the start-ups then struggled to switch from serving 
nonprofi ts and their benefi ciaries to targeting paying customers (in part 
because investors perceived the business to be “tainted” by its nonprofi t 
endeavors). As a result, start-ups that are designed for donors rather than 
for customers—that is, social enterprises and not-for-profi ts—to char-
acterize technology entrepreneurship in Nairobi. Th is, in turn, can frus-
trate investors, who have, in some cases, become uncertain about the 
for-profi t market potential in Kenya and have voiced doubts about the 
market focus of technology entrepreneurship. 
 Given the prevailing ambiguity of what constitutes a technology 
consumer market, many start-ups have attempted to address multiple 
markets simultaneously in order to generate revenue. One informant, 
for instance, said, “Th e core [technology] product is not paying enough 
money right now, so we have other projects — for example, a monitoring 
and evaluations tool for corporations to measure performance.” However, 
maintaining a sustained competitive advantage in multiple markets 
simultaneously requires signifi cant resource and capabilities, neither of 
which tend to be readily available to new ventures, thus making failure 
more likely. 
 Recommendations for Policy and Practice: 
Connecting Perspectives 
 In this section, we return to the initial question that motivated the chap-
ter: What are the challenges associated with new forms of entrepreneurial 
activity in emerging markets? We conducted a qualitative case study of 
technology entrepreneurship in Nairobi, which constitutes a relatively 
new form of entrepreneurial activity in the region. Our analysis revealed 
that key actors’ understandings of technology entrepreneurship do not 
yet align. Instead, entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and investors 
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expressed contradictory, divergent, and misaligned views about the avail-
ability of capital, the prioritization of business skills, and the readiness 
of local technology markets. Th is, in turn, promoted the persistence of 
additional barriers to technology entrepreneurship:
 1.  Contradictory views on the availability of capital mean that entrepre-
neurs need additional resources (fi nancial, temporal, and human) to 
bridge the contradictions and obtain funding. 
 2.  Divergent views on which business skills are crucial at the onset of the 
entrepreneurial journey distract entrepreneurs from developing their 
start-up. 
 3.  Misaligned views of what constitutes a viable market for technology 
innovations make technology markets ambiguous. 
 To be sure, key actors’ perspectives may align over time. However, we 
conclude that novel forms of entrepreneurial activity in emerging mar-
kets are especially hampered by a lack of shared perspectives among key 
actors. Specifi cally, our chapter has shown that building successful tech-
nology start- ups in Nairobi remains diffi  cult because of the contradictory, 
divergent, and misaligned perspectives on technology entrepreneurship. 
 Our analysis has concrete implications for those seeking to facilitate 
the creation of sustainable technology businesses in Kenya (and possibly 
those promoting new forms of entrepreneurial activity in other emerg-
ing markets), which we detail below. Specifi cally, our recommendations 
depart from the conventional approach of defi ning, measuring, and 
fi lling gaps associated with funding, skill training, and market readi-
ness—because our analysis has found that the defi nitions of these gaps 
diff ers substantially between key actors, and simply fi lling them is there-
fore unlikely to facilitate technology entrepreneurship in the long term. 
Instead, we argue that it is important to resolve the contradictory, diver-
gent, and misaligned perspectives among the key actors, and we off er 
three concrete recommendations on how to achieve this. 
 1. Encourage reﬂ ection through discourse 
 Greater awareness of others’ backgrounds, interests and positions 
among the key actors, and refl ection on one’s own biases and expectations 
may help move the situation toward a middle ground where  disconnected 
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perspectives can in fact be connected. Initially, a handful of individuals 
championed the nascence of technology entrepreneurship in Nairobi, 
which sparked the fi rst crucial instances of social interaction around tech-
nology entrepreneurship. As our analysis has demonstrated, however, it 
may now be benefi cial to refl ect on how the current structures of social 
interaction seem to perpetuate disconnected perspectives. 
 Discourse, especially, can facilitate refl ection by enabling the various 
actors to voice their positions and understand those of others. Discourse 
can take various forms: blogging, engaging with media, events, and even 
simple person-to-person interactions. Although these types of interac-
tions already occur regularly, they have too often been limited to homo-
geneous groups that merely reaffi  rm their agendas instead of engaging 
with those whose perspectives may be disconnected from their own. 
Technology entrepreneurs and hub employees, for instance, attend 
events at innovation hubs—events that, as a hub employee noted, are also 
intended for investors (though they rarely choose to attend). Meaningful 
discourse occurs when all actors alike take the initiative to create avenues 
for frequent interactions that are respectful and can ideally be benefi cial 
to the interests of all involved. 
 2. Recognize Nairobi’s context-speciﬁ city 
 Entrepreneurship tends to be circumstantial and highly context- 
specifi c. Specifi cally, One aspect specifi c to technology entrepreneurship 
in Nairobi is the salient mix of local and international actors that we have 
alluded to in this chapter. Although potentially potent, the heterogene-
ity of the technology entrepreneurship community in Nairobi has also 
created signifi cant information asymmetries. Local entrepreneurs, for 
instance, often complain that the computer science curricula of Nairobi’s 
universities are outdated. Simultaneously, although the international 
actors tend to be equipped with technology skills, they often lack the 
context-specifi c knowledge of how to do business in Nairobi, knowledge 
that is often second nature to the local actors. A convergence of knowl-
edge bases, by growing the local actors’ technology business skills and 
the international actors’ understanding of Nairobi, would reduce infor-
mation asymmetries and thereby facilitate the alignment of perspectives. 
A straightforward way of building local technology know-how could be 
through updating and improving classroom curricula. Increasing the 
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context-specifi c knowledge of international actors, however, may require 
a longer-term shift in mind-sets, as demonstrated by one respondent’s 
frustration that “many investors still think people in Africa live in huts.” 
 3. Articulate a shared objective 
 In addition, the articulation of a common objective—the creation of 
a sense of “we’re all in this together”—may also help connect the actors’ 
contradictory, divergent, and misaligned perspectives on technology 
entrepreneurship in Nairobi. Often, the actors’ diff ering backgrounds 
and interests overshadow their shared common interests. Most saliently, 
this manifests between local and foreign actors, where the locals’ mantra 
of “Th is is how we do things in Kenya” stands in opposition to foreign-
ers’ stance of adhering to their own ways of doing things. Emphasizing a 
larger overarching objective, such as the goal of building one of Africa’s 
fi rst sustainable technology entrepreneurship communities, could 
align the actors under a shared vision and help bridge their diff erences. 
Policymakers and technology thought leaders who refl ect on the role of 
technology entrepreneurship in Kenya’s economy at large may be espe-
cially well positioned to articulate such a shared vision. A more explicit 
articulation of the specifi cities and visions associated with technology 
entrepreneurship in particular might allow the nonlocal actors to root 
their expectations and perspectives in local realities rather than in unex-
amined hopes and expectations about what it might have meant to build 
technology businesses in Nairobi. 
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 Conversation #9 
 Toward a Systematic 
Approach to Building Ventures 
 Jessica Colaço and Ibanga Umanah 
of Brave Venture Labs 
 Jessica Colaço recently co-founded Brave Venture Labs, East Africa’s ﬁ rst ven-
ture builder, based in Nairobi, with co-founder Ibanga Umanah. In 2010, she 
co-founded the iHub with Erik Hersman and served in various leadership posi-
tions there—as its Founding Manager between 2010 and 2011, as its Director 
of Partnerships and Community, and, at iHub Research, as its Research 
Director between 2011 and 2013. She is passionate about innovation, research, 
mobile and robotics technology, talent, and entrepreneurship in Kenya. She 
serves as an African start-up evangelist and advisor to various tech startups, 
using her position in Kenya to encourage local, regional, and international 
stakeholders to explore, understand, and adopt Kenyan-made and African-
made solutions. 
 Ibanga Umanah  partners with leaders to grow new businesses. He 
recently co-founded Brave Venture Labs to build new ventures from Africa. 
Earlier, he worked with Jump Associates (in California) to create growth 
strategies for Fortune 100 companies. He designed new health services for 
country ministries, launched technology products for logistics companies, 
and prototyped service innovations for retailers. In addition to Brave, 
Ibanga develops growth strategies for small businesses, lectures at design 
and leadership programs, and teaches skiing to anyone willing to fall in 
love with snow. 
 Jessica, why did you decide to start Brave Venture Labs after your six 
years at iHub? 
 J essica : It is diffi  cult to summarize six years of work at the iHub in a 
nutshell. But during this period, I came to understand the power of net-
works and the serendipity eff ect, meaning the eff ect of bringing people 
together and watching the unexpected happen—through collaboration 
and learning. Every single day, I would get an email with a question that 
usually went like this: “I have an idea! How can I fl esh it out and how can 
I turn this into a viable tech business?” 
 Two things to note. First, I am passionate about problem solving. So 
yes, I am the right person to address with those sorts of questions. And 
second, it is about talent, nurturing young talent, and unleashing their 
potential. Th e iHub provided me with a sandbox where I could experi-
ment with talent and problems in order to solve the problems and men-
tor young entrepreneurs. 
 But eventually, six years later, it was time to move on and become 
more risk-taking. Th e new challenge that I am tackling now with Ibanga 
at Brave Venture Labs is matching talent with opportunities to build 
truly scalable and successful businesses, not just in tech but across mul-
tiple sectors—wherever we identify opportunities that are ripe for a busi-
ness solution. 
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 During my time at the iHub, I came across a lot of talented entrepre-
neurs and developers as well as striking business opportunities. How do I 
connect the dots? Th is thought became the genesis of a longer discovery 
process, as I like to call it, in which I realized that I am a builder and con-
necter—someone who likes to start and create organizations and build 
teams in order to make it all grow and last. 
 A good colleague and friend of mine connected me to Ibanga. While I 
was in San Francisco, we actually met there and discovered that our inter-
ests and values aligned. We both have a deeper interest and motivation in 
creating scalable businesses and unleashing the potential of people to do 
the unimaginable! 
 Ibanga, what is the motivation behind Brave Venture Labs? How did 
the idea emerge? 
 I banga : In 1995, I lived with my father in Nigeria’s Delta. Fights over 
oil had reached the highest levels and former President Abacha’s cruel 
response left a sharp impression. As an American up until then, I saw 
money from my country of birth funding a government hell-bent on 
tearing down the lives of those close to me. I left Nigeria wanting to work 
on two problems in my life: How can we build organizations that are 
more benefi cial to, and less hurtful for, individuals and society? And how 
can we position intelligent, ambitious people to lead those organizations? 
 After experimenting with a few companies of my own, I decided to 
tackle the fi rst problem, initially with Ed Cohen, building a school for 
executives in India, and later with Dev Patnaik, creating new ventures for 
corporates at Jump Associates. Perhaps it is obvious to most folks, but 
I found corporations fi lled with people genuinely pursuing what they 
believe is right. Rare moments of corruption and breaks in ethics were 
often preceded by a slow erosion of purpose and empathy in leaders. So 
together with both Ed and Dev, we worked to instill purpose and empa-
thy into leadership decisions and solutions. We developed new methods 
for understanding and building unique customer insight, for collaborat-
ing with peers to make strategic choices, and for continuously generating, 
prototyping, and learning in the market. Along the way, we found that 
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continuously grounding ourselves in data all around us—from consum-
ers, teams, and stakeholders—we were able to increase not only impact, 
but the speed of work. You might call it human-centered problem solving. 
 Leaders who found a clear purpose, built empathy, and continuously 
learned, were able to organize their teams to solve what often seemed like 
impossible challenges. For instance, I recently left a meeting with Ratan 
Tata [former chairman of the Tata Group of Mumbai] awestruck by his 
masterful use of purpose, empathy, and learning to solve one challenge 
after another. Tata’s Nano project started as a sketch in his diary of a 
moped with a shield. Seeing families of four piled together, unprotected 
from wild traffi  c in the middle of often harsh Indian weather, was unac-
ceptable. He believed every family should have access to safe transit. Tata 
took the sketch to his colleagues to experiment on solutions for what 
would ultimately become the world’s most aff ordable car. His eff orts 
have shocked automotive manufacturing and, more important, improved 
transportation safety for thousands. Th e thing is, despite all his success, 
he spent most of the conversation inquiring about us. I have never met a 
more humble and curious person. I walked away realizing his practice of 
humility and curiosity was what actually allowed him to notice his sur-
roundings and continue to learn (at age 77!). Humility and curiosity were 
the foundation of Tata’s personal legacy of success. 
 Looking back, it seemed nearly all our successes, on seemingly impos-
sible challenges, involved leaders who valued humility and continuously 
learned. If we were able to apply our skills in problem solving to Africa, 
perhaps we could accelerate the development of more human-centered 
problem solvers like Tata—people who seem to do the impossible. 
 So we founded Brave! 
 Jessica, why is there such a strong focus on talent? And how do you 
ensure you match the right talent with the right opportunity? 
 J essica : Let me explain this using some of my own experiences. In my 
mind, I always thought I would be coding and heavily involved in com-
puter science—basically just writing code and building algorithms all my 
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life in a lab. It was the people around me who discovered my most innate 
qualities and abilities. For me, the power of networks and having people 
around me at the right time were critical. During my time at Strathmore 
University, there were people like Dr. Sevilla and Edwin Nyanducha who 
realized I was a really good problem solver and that, at the same time, 
I had this affi  nity to organize events and bring people together. At that 
time, I had no clue—because I was very shy! I also did not know that I 
had skills in business development until Edwin pointed it out to me and 
threw me into the deep end of the pool with an actual business client. 
 Similarly with TED. I applied in 2009, and became a TED global 
fellow. I could not believe it! I had to go on stage in front of hundreds 
of people and speak about my mobile project—Wireless Map Service. 
Th e event, however, pushed me to the next level of thinking more deeply 
and taking on bigger challenges. Because of that challenging but positive 
experience, I believe in the art of unleashing the best in people. Over 
time, I have been able to spot talent, and by now I know by observing 
and giving people a few tasks what they are good at and where they need 
a little push to realize their full potential. 
 At Brave we were doing two things. On the one hand, we were cre-
ating an entrepreneurs’ “forensic” map, another word for a systematic 
overview of their talents, individual qualities, and characteristics. By now, 
we have auditioned hundreds of entrepreneurs and developers and have 
built up a solid overview of what is out there. As a side note, we do 
not believe in job interviews, so we work on some challenges together 
with the entrepreneurs and, in that way, fi nd out where their capabilities 
are. On the other hand, we identify—through systematic and rigorous 
research—business opportunities and work with 20 potential candidates 
in our challenge days on a joint investment thesis. As we progress, people 
who are not suitable drop out and a core group emerges. 
 Ibanga, you want to create leaders with a particular mindset around 
problem solving. Why is a venture builder the right model for doing so? 
 I banga : We are committed to advancing leaders who take on and 
solve big problems. Refl ecting on our work investing in and supporting 
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entrepreneurs, we noticed two challenges getting in the way. One, many 
ideas are not scalable, usually because the original problem itself is too 
small. Two, teams rigidly focus on building their idea, as opposed to 
doing whatever it takes to solve their problem. 
 What do bigger problems look like? When Elon Musk was deciding 
what to work on after PayPal, he wrote down a list of fi ve issues that will 
most aff ect the future of humanity: the Internet, sustainable energy, space 
exploration (permanent extension of life beyond earth), artifi cial intelli-
gence, and reprogramming the human genetic code. Tesla and SolarCity 
were both founded to take on the signifi cant challenge of sustainable 
energy. And while he initially focused on better electric vehicles, better 
batteries and solar installation were clear additions. 
 One of our favorite Kenyan companies, Sendy, recognized the need 
for access to formal goods within an informal and continuously evolving 
infrastructure. Most folks do not receive goods at an address, making 
e-commerce mostly ineff ective. And between an inconsistently distrib-
uted retail sector and terrible traffi  c, it is costly to track down the goods 
you might want. Today, Sendy off ers real-time, point-to-point urban 
deliveries using smartphones and motorbikes. But it is not inconceivable 
for them to manage last-mile scheduling and logistics for any kind of 
inventory. Th e challenge is enormous. 
 We can refer back to Tata’s humility as an example of putting problems 
above ideas. I mentioned his original sketch was a shielded bike. It looked 
a bit like a fancy rickshaw. However, after two months of prototyping and 
testing, his team found that consumers were much more interested in an 
aff ordable car. So they shifted. As long as he was achieving aff ordable, safe 
transit, the specifi c idea was not important. 
 One might look at our challenge of creating a human-centered, learn-
ing mindset around problem solving and say, “Obviously you should 
pursue education for founders or young teams.” But what my time spent 
doing new business creation and transformation at Jump taught me is 
that people learn through the work. Th e evidence continues to grow in 
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this respect. Sugata Mitra showed that kids can teach themselves hard sci-
ences with a computer in a wall. Leading A.I. developers, neuroscientists, 
and learning theorists like Ray Kurzweil have argued that people’s natural 
sense of curiosity, creativity, and experimentation drive learning. 
 So rather than teach people to solve problems in a classroom, we will 
co-build companies with them. We will build to learn. 
 A venture builder is an ideal mechanism for learning. Generally 
speaking, a venture builder is a company that creates companies. In 
our approach, we continuously evaluate and share quantitative and 
qualitative market data to clarify problems entrepreneurs might tackle, 
then partner with a potential chief executive offi  cer (CEO) and co-
create an idea. Together, we study the market, prototype with custom-
ers, and refi ne our model until we fi nd a fi t and potential for scale. We 
do provide some starting capital, but our CEOs are expected to raise 
their own funds. Like most accelerators, we have distilled plenty of 
business-building methods and convened the best resources in the eco-
system. However, rather than run people through a linear, time-bound, 
task-oriented program where everyone launches a website at the same 
time, we create an environment where a team can quickly access a wide 
variety of resources to accelerate toward a broad objective. We create 
metrics for achieving product–market fi t or traction or positive cash 
fl ow and then convene the right mix of support for that company to 
achieve its goal. 
 In a way we are an institution of co-founders, multiplying our expe-
rience by convening the best of the ecosystem. If we are doing it right, 
we are increasing the level of start-up performance and generating more 
sustainable solutions for society. 
 Jessica, can you walk us through the ideation process and how this all 
leads up to actually starting a venture? 
 J essica : Brave is kind of like a start-up studio, meaning our 
 processes are aligned to fully fl esh out and start implementing an idea 
that addresses a problem. Right now, for example, we are looking at a 
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 specifi c problem between commercial education and young profession-
als who cannot aff ord the education they need. So we came up with a 
platform idea that matches students with corporates and organizations 
that will issue a loan and off er future employment once the graduate 
completes the degree. 
 Th e process for this solution looked like this. First, Ibanga and 
I identify sectors with ripe opportunities. We looked particularly at 
the middle to upper class in Nairobi. Th rough industry-sector reports 
from PricewaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte, we narrowed the focus 
to particular sectors. In fact, with Brave, we are looking at fi ve sectors 
at the moment—health, fi nance, agriculture, tourism, and education. 
Now we dig even deeper into each sector, conducting market and 
customer research to understand the dynamics. Th is process is com-
pletely self- funded. In health, for example, we want to focus on pre-
ventive health care, in fi nance on peer-to-peer lending, in agriculture 
on food trading and food wastage, in tourism on domestic tourism, 
and, as I mentioned, in education on the commercial side of higher 
education. 
 After that we conduct a challenge day with 20 individuals—entrepre-
neurs and developers—who understand the sector, and we note down all 
assumptions each business idea has. We formulated a research poster (6 
by 4 feet) with all this information and walked each individual through 
our process to get the thinking started. Picture it as a collective brain-
storming session in which we test business ideas in order to come up 
with a clear overview on the problem, the opportunity, and the “right” 
business idea. 
 Th e next step is a written opportunity abstract, forming an invest-
ment thesis that we use as a basis to sources the right talent—these are 
co-founders with whom we create the business to get the implementation 
started. Once all the founders are on board, Brave will co-build the busi-
ness with the co-founders and get to work. 
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 Ibanga, what are some of the tools you use to aﬀ ect this mindset 
change and why, in your opinion, are those in particular of value? 
 I banga : We continuously pull principles and practices from as many 
disciplines as possible, as opposed to following one idea to the letter. 
And often, several disciplines form a unique approach to achieving the 
same end. 
 For example, think of all the diff erent ways we talk about “keeping an 
open mind” so we can learn:
•  Neuroplasticity 
•  Beginner’s mind 
•  Growth mindset 
•  Rapid prototyping 
•  Vertical learning 
•  Creative intuition 
•  Mindfulness 
•  Mental fl exibility 
 Neuroplasticity proposes that the human brain continues to change 
over the course of its life. As we age, experience new things, and chal-
lenge ourselves, we continue to learn. In other words, you are never done 
learning. 
 Beginner’s mind, a concept from Zen Buddhist philosophy, asks that 
we continue to see the world around us from the point of view of a child. 
If we look at people or experiences as if we were a beginner, we might 
notice new nuances and continue to learn. 
 Carol Dweck teaches folks to look at themselves and their teams as 
having the potential to learn with practice rather than seeing people as 
“born talented” or not. Folks with a growth mindset see failure as an 
opportunity to learn and get better. So we can continue to challenge 
ourselves and each other to learn something new from any experience. 
Conversation #9: Colaço and Umanah of Brave Venture Labs 299
 Rapid prototyping, as applied to solutions beyond 3D models, 
approaches product design like a science experiment. We make obser-
vations and generate predictions about what might work—otherwise 
known as having ideas! Th en we develop tests to see what works and 
what does not and improve our ideas. By quickly and cheaply gathering 
data to iterate, we increase our chance of market performance before run-
ning out of money. We learn from and improve with every attempt. Said 
another way, we actively learn from failure. 
 Information and techniques from every one of these areas will be use-
ful as we go about the work of developing new business ideas. We will use 
the same multidisciplinary mash-up for how to best research customers, 
work in teams, optimize systems, and so on. 
 Jessica and Ibanga, is the venture builder addressing a niche in Kenya 
in particular or do you see this approach as being useful globally? 
 I banga : Continuous learning and the hybridization of disciplines to 
solve problems are useful globally. My friends in San Francisco continue 
to combine the best of social science and data science to construct better 
ways of working, the best engineering and design to create better experi-
ences, and the latest business strategies and psychology to build businesses 
models around new behaviors. And although I practiced it there, it is 
almost certainly happening in every creative economy around the world. 
 For example, in 1978, Nicholas Negroponte and colleagues at MIT 
received government funding to create digital tools to familiarize soldiers 
with remote locations. Building off  of some work by early fi lmmakers, 
the Aspen Movie Map team built a camera array on a car, drove the 
streets of Boston, and using the then-new technology of laserdiscs (which 
could associate a location tag with a specifi c point on the disc), created 
a virtual, searchable map of the city. Building on the idea more than 25 
years, later Larry Page used the technology to create Google Street view. 
Basic legal practices and publishing had eff ectively allowed fi lmmakers, 
government, academics, and start-ups to collaborate on creating one of 
the most widely used products today. 
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 Th e opportunity for Kenya, and I imagine for most countries, is the 
ongoing practice of making it easier and culturally “okay” for this kind of 
collaboration to take place and be fruitful. 
 J essica : Our idea is not to stay in Nairobi. We see our longer-term 
task as connecting the dots on a pan-African scale. Once the fi rst two 
 companies are up and running, we will move to other cities across the 
continent, directed by market dynamics and our network’s strength. 
Right now, the destination for our next set of companies would be 
Ghana, Nigeria, or South Africa. 
 Ibanga, what are the crucial ingredients needed to build a venture 
that can advance society? 
 I banga : Th ere are two parts of a new venture to consider, broadly speak-
ing. First, solve a problem for people with an innovative model, experi-
ence, and/or technology. How innovative you need to be really depends 
on the problem. Second, organize people in an institution to execute. 
Every business is a structure for a group of people to work together. 
 You might think of our role in the second part as similar to how US 
insurance companies manage care networks. Using a combination of 
real-time data and frequent contact with members, they evaluate per-
formance and negotiate rates with the best mix of services required to 
quickly address a particular disease. When successful, in addition to 
reducing prices for patients, they can streamline a care pathway and boost 
the overall quality of treatment. 
 At Brave, we work to evaluate and convene new-business ecosystems, 
including lawyers, accountants, and subject-matter experts, to stand up, 
operate, and grow companies—faster, smarter, and at lower costs. 
 Creative problem solving is also systematic in a sense but should be 
seen more as a continuous-learning model than as a linear fl ow of activi-
ties. On some level, the analogy for us here is the scientifi c method. We 
attempt to understand the world, create hypotheses, conduct experiments, 
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allow our views to evolve based on new information, and  continuously 
update our solutions. 
 If we stop there, we just get the ventures. So, to the second part: if 
you want any human system, including entrepreneurship, to advance you 
need two more things. First, many people experimenting with their own 
approaches in a variety of settings. And two, previous discoveries docu-
mented and shared so the next generation can critique and advance that 
work. 
 Th e truth is, there is no shortage of intelligent, exploratory entrepre-
neurs in Kenya. Th e challenge is recording and exposing what they have 
learned so that how we work can be improved. Th e faster we can make 
the learning cycle, the better we can become. 
 As a normal practice of creating ventures, Brave is deeply involved in 
both listening to and learning from respected entrepreneurs as well as 
encouraging experimentation and improvement in every new generation 
of builders. 
 Th ank you, Jessica and Ibanga! 
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